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Abstract 
We investigate the dynamic effects of a charitable lottery and an income tax on donations. 
The analysis is based on a two-round dictator game with the subject’s charity of choice as 
recipient and additional incentives in the first round only. The immediate effect of a charitable 
lottery leads to higher contributions and we cannot find substantial crowding out of voluntary 
contributions in the presence of an income tax. These economic interventions weakly spill-
over to the subsequent donation decisions without additional incentives. Our results suggest 
the presence of consistency seeking behaviour. This is especially true for a subgroup of 
participants with a rule-based mind-set and our research shows the importance of the subjects’ 
moral framework in the context of dynamic pro-social behaviour.  
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1. Introduction 
Voluntary contributions to public goods are an important driver of social welfare. This fact is 
echoed by economic research exploring ways to stimulate individual contributions, in 
particular in the context of charitable giving. While there is broad literature on the immediate 
impact of different informational or economic interventions, dynamic effects are often 
ignored. This paper analyses the effects of short term interventions on immediate and 
subsequent donation behaviour. 
Evidence from social psychology suggests that moral behaviour is not static (Monin and 
Miller 2001, Sachdeva et al. 2009). In particular, there are two opposing theoretical concepts 
on dynamic effects: behavioural consistency and moral balancing. Behavioural consistency 
assumes that individuals avoid inconsistent behaviour as they dislike cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger 1957, Taylor 1975, Cialdini et al. 1995). This view is in line with the economic 
theory on stable social preferences, supported by different studies on repeated pro-social 
behaviour (e.g. Landry et al. 2010, de Oliveira et al. 2011 and Carlsson et al. 2012). However, 
there is also evidence for moral balancing, an alternative theory claiming that individuals may 
fluctuate in moral behaviour to achieve a certain moral self-image (e.g. Merritt et al 2010, 
Jordan et al. 2011). More specifically, this theory of moral regulation (e.g. Sachdeva et al. 
2009) claims that past good (bad) deeds increase the likelihood of bad (good) deeds in the 
future. There is experimental evidence for this concept by Mazar and Zhong (2010). Given 
the mixed evidence, it is not clear how charitable donations evolve over time, especially when 
previously motivated by economic mechanisms stimulating contributions. 
In this paper, we experimentally analyse the dynamics of two well-known drivers of 
charitable giving: a charitable lottery and an income tax. We create a setting of repeated 
donations using a two-round dictator game with the subject’s charity of choice as recipient. In 
the charitable lottery treatment, first round contributions are linked to the chance of winning a 
fixed common value lottery prize. In the tax treatment, we levy an income tax of 25% on the 
participants’ first round endowment, which is automatically transferred to the charity of 
choice. In a control condition, we ask subjects to donate twice without any additional 
incentive. Analysing behaviour in the second round, which is identical across treatments and 
does not contain any stimuli, allows us to capture the behavioural response to the removal of 
the additional incentives. 
We show that a charitable lottery is effective in increasing voluntary contributions in the lab, 
confirming evidence from the field (e.g. Landry et al. 2006). In contrast to previous evidence, 
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the introduction of an income tax leaves the voluntary contribution level unchanged in our 
experiment. We find increased total transfers in the first rounds of the lottery and the tax 
treatment, followed by marginally higher second round donations compared to baseline. This 
result prevails on the aggregate level especially for subjects with a rule-based mind-set. Our 
results add new insights on both the immediate and the dynamic effects of charitable lotteries 
and taxation and also suggest a first step towards the consideration of different moral 
motivations and their effects on behaviour. 
2. Related Literature 
With respect to charitable lotteries, the literature has yielded mixed experimental evidence on 
the immediate impact on contributions to a public good. Laboratory experiments tend to find a 
superiority of lotteries (with a common value prize) compared to a plain voluntary 
contribution mechanism (Morgan and Sefton 2000, Lange et al. 2007, Orzen 2008, Corazzini 
et al. 2010). All of these lotteries, however, use a common value prize in a public goods game 
framework. To the best of our knowledge, non-strategic charitable lotteries have only been 
tested in the field. In a door-to-door fundraising campaign, Landry et al. (2006) report 
donations to increase when linking contributions to a charitable lottery. In contrast, Onderstal 
et al. (2013) do not find a significant effect of a charitable lottery in a field experiment in the 
Netherlands. According to the authors, this distinct result may be due to the private value of 
the implemented charitable lottery or to cultural difference between the U.S. and Europe.  
With respect to taxation, econometric and experimental studies tend to show incomplete 
crowding out of voluntary contributions. Econometric studies (e.g. Steinberg 1991, Kingma 
1989, Manzoor and Straub 2005, Ribar and Wilhelm 2002, Payne 1998 and Andreoni and 
Payne 2011) find incomplete crowding out mostly ranging between 0 and 50 percent of the 
imposed tax. Compared to these studies, Andreoni and Payne (2011) find an exceptionally 
high crowding out of 73%, induced by cut backs in fundraising by the charity due to getting 
governmental grants. Experimental studies (e.g. Andreoni 1993, Bolton and Katok 1998, 
Chan et al. 2002 and Eckel et al. 2005) tend to estimate substantially higher levels of 
crowding out. Andreoni (1993) shows in one of the first laboratory experiment on this topic 
high but incomplete levels (71%) of crowding out in a public goods game. Bolton and Katok 
(1998) introduce a tax into a standard dictator game avoiding strategic effects inherent in 
public good games. They find also high but incomplete levels of crowding out (73.7%). The 
study most related to our experiment is Eckel et al. (2005), who use a dictator game with the 
2 
 
subject’s charity of choice as a recipient in a two-factor, between-subjects design. Firstly, 
initial allocations are either US$18 for the subject and US$2 for her charity of choice or 
US$15 and US$5, respectively. The second factor is the frame. In one treatment, initial 
allocations are given in a neutral way without referring to the tax context. Using this no-tax 
frame, they find a level of crowding out close to zero. In the other treatment, the imposed 
initial allocations are framed as resulting from an income tax on subjects' own endowments. 
Using this tax frame, Eckel et al. (2005) find nearly full crowding out. They conclude that 
imposed transfers do not crowd out private giving when the source of its funding is not 
apparent to the subjects. Summarizing the previous research, experimental analyses tend to 
find higher levels of crowding out than econometric analyses outside the lab. Up to now, little 
is known about the drivers of these different results. One possible reason is the larger number 
of donors in empirical as opposed to experimental studies, which may lead to asymptotically 
zero crowding out (Ribar and Wilhelm 2002). Other explanations for the contrast in 
econometric and experimental studies are fiscal illusion (Eckel et al. 2005) or the crowding 
out of fundraising activities (Andreoni and Payne 2011). 
Psychological literature documented two contrasting theories, namely behavioural consistency 
and moral regulation on the dynamic effects of these interventions. On the one hand, there is 
evidence for stable pro-social behaviour in repeated donations. De Oliveira et al. (2011) 
identify the existence of a “giving type” donating to different organisations. In their 
experiment, however, only one decision was paid at the end, which does not allow for a 
potential effect of moral licensing. Carlsson et al. (2012) confirm constant pro-social 
behaviour over a time period of several years in the context of donations and volunteer work. 
On the other hand, evidence for moral regulation suggesting that past good deeds decrease the 
likelihood of additional good deeds in the future is found in related (e.g. Monin and Miller 
2001) as well as in unrelated domains (e.g. Khan and Dhar 2006, Mazar and Zhong 2010, 
Clot et al. 2011, Jordan et al. 2011), especially when individuals can well remember their 
previous behaviour (e.g. Merritt et al. 2010, Jordan et al. 2011).1 The economic literature also 
provides support for moral balancing. In a cheating game, spillovers from previous 
experiments directly affect generosity (Ploner and Regner 2013). Based on various repeated 
dictator and prisoner’s dilemma games, Brosig et al. (2007) find that other-regarding 
preferences wash out over time. 
1 For a detailed overview on moral licensing in empirical analyses, please see Merritt et al. (2010). 
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With respect to the dynamic effects of experimental interventions on voluntary contributions, 
we are aware of three studies. In a door-to-door fundraising campaign, Landry et al. (2010) 
re-approach the participants of an earlier fundraising campaign (Landry et al. 2006, see 
above) and analyse whether the previous treatments still had behavioural effects. The authors 
find that people initially stimulated by a lottery continue to give more in the subsequent 
campaign while those attracted by a non-economic incentive scheme (attractiveness of the 
donation collector) did not. Shang and Croson (2009) vary social information in a local radio 
station’s on-air fund drive. Participants calling the station to make a pledge received different 
information on previous contributions of others. The results show that providing the potential 
donors with higher numbers (information drawn from the 90th and 95th percentile) induced 
increased contributions. Participants provided with information from the high percentiles 
continued to give more and more often one year later. In contrast, Meier (2007), who analyses 
matching grants in the field, finds no positive treatment effects in the long run and a negative 
effect for donations in the first period after the removal of the matching scheme. 
To sum it up, the experimental evidence on the static and dynamic effects of charitable 
lotteries and income tax is mixed. In particular, little is known about the dynamic effects of 
these mechanisms. Therefore, we conduct a laboratory experiment on the dynamics of 
donation behaviour, especially when donations are incentivised by the economic mechanisms 
of either a charitable lottery or an income tax.  
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1 Experimental Design 
Modelling donations to charities as voluntary public good provision has a long tradition (e.g. 
Bergstrom et al. 1986, Andreoni 1989, Morgan 2000). Contrary to (repeated) public good 
games, however, real donation decisions typically do not involve strategic behaviour. In 
response, dictator games (DG) have started to be employed in analysing donation decisions 
(e.g. Bolton and Katok 1998, Eckel et al. 2005). We extend this literature and investigate the 
dynamic effects of a charitable lottery and an income tax on donation behaviour. For that 
purpose, we use a modified two-round dictator game. The subjects are endowed with €8 and 
choose a charity as the recipient in each round.  
In the first round, we vary the incentives for giving by introducing a charitable lottery or an 
income tax in two different treatments. We choose these two well-known economic 
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mechanisms to reflect distinct incentives with potentially opposing effects on voluntary 
contributions. In baseline, subjects are asked to decide on their donations in the absence of 
any additional incentives. In the lottery treatment, subjects’ contributions in the first round are 
linked to the chance of winning a fixed lottery prize of €100. For each €0.50 contributed to 
the charity, subjects get a raffle ticket. The probability of winning the prize depends on the 
ratio of the players' own contributions to overall contributions in the first round of the lottery 
treatment (see Morgan 2000).2 In the tax treatment we use a similar design as in Eckel et al. 
(2005) and implement an income tax of 25% on the subject’s first round endowment, while 
leaving €6 at their free disposal. Forced contributions are labelled as ‘income tax’, since this 
framing shows the highest crowding out effect in Eckel et al. (2005). Subjects are informed 
that the tax of €2 is automatically transferred to their charity of choice. In the second round, 
the additional incentives, the charitable lottery and the income tax, are removed. Hence, the 
second round is identical in all treatments.  
[about here: Table 1: Summary of Experimental Design] 
3.2 Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in October 2013 at the mLab of the University of Mannheim. 
Subjects were recruited via Orsee (Greiner, 2004). In our experiment 148 students from 
different academic disciplines participated in nine sessions. In all treatments, subjects were 
seated in separate cubicles and instructed about the rules of the game by means of a 
manuscript (all instructions are provided in appendix A1). The subjects were told that there 
are two rounds in which they could earn money and were informed about the donation 
procedure in their manuscript before taking their decisions. In each round, subjects received 
an envelope with €8 as their endowment and a list of six charities.3 The subjects were asked 
to tick their charity of choice and to note down the amount of their contributions 
anonymously.  
After the decision making, subjects put both the decision sheet and the corresponding coins 
into an envelope, which they were also asked to seal. The envelopes were collected after each 
2 Note that this design follows natural charitable lotteries, in which winning probabilities also depend on the 
(unknown) contributions of others. 
3 In the two rounds, subjects received two different lists of charities (see appendix A2). Both lists contain 
charities related to either environmental issues, energy poverty, poverty or medical issues. The lists contained the 
charities with the highest cumulative national donations to guarantee similar attractiveness of the lists. A pilot 
experiment confirmed the equality of attractiveness. Nevertheless, we randomized the two lists over subjects and 
did not identify a significant effect when controlling for the specific lists in the econometric analysis. 
5 
 
                                                          
round and transferred to a notary after the experiment. Under supervision of the notary, the 
envelopes were opened, donations were recorded and the money was transferred to the 
respective charity organisations via the notary’s escrow account. To further enhance 
credibility, participants received an email about the total amount of donations and could 
access this information on the project homepage alternatively.4  
The notary additionally created lottery tickets with the (anonymous) subject code for each 
€0.50 donated in the first round of the lottery treatment. Then, all tickets were put in a box 
and one ticket was drawn under the supervision of the notary. The winner code was emailed 
to all participants of the lottery treatment. The winner picked up the €100 in cash upon 
providing his personal code.5  
In the first round of the tax treatment, subjects were additionally informed about the income 
tax and were told that they had to place two out of the received €8 in the envelope 
independent of their donation. The participants were informed that their imposed contribution 
of €2 will be transferred to their charity of choice, also via the notary’s escrow account. To 
avoid confusion in the second round, we explicitly pointed out that there was no longer a 
charitable lottery or an income tax, respectively.  
4. Hypotheses 
In the first round we implement a charitable lottery or an income tax to incentivise giving. 
Due to the additional monetary incentive of a charitable lottery, in which the probability of 
winning the prize is influenced by the subject’s raffle tickets and the total number of raffle 
tickets sold (see Duncan 2002), we expect subjects to donate more than in the first round of 
the baseline treatment (see results in Morgan and Sefton 2002 in a public goods environment 
with a fixed-prize lottery).  
H1: A charitable lottery leads to higher voluntary contributions in the first round 
compared to baseline. 
The introduction of an income tax leads to crowding out if subjects care about the level of 
public goods provided (see e.g. Warr 1982, 1983, Roberts 1984, Bergstrom et al. 1986). 
Individual donors will treat their voluntary contributions to a public good as a perfect 
4 www.zew.de/soko2013 
5 Note that the prize is part of the design and was not paid by the charities themselves. Therefore, also no 
administrative costs occur. 
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substitute for their imposed contributions through taxation and, as a consequence, reduce their 
voluntary contributions by the full amount of the governmental funding. Incomplete crowding 
out might occur due to warm glow, as in this case utility gains from giving should not be 
affected by an income tax (see e.g. Crumpler and Grossman 2008). 
H2: An income tax crowds out voluntary contributions in the first round compared to 
baseline. 
For the dynamic effects, as choice situations in the second round are identical for all subjects, 
economic standard theory would predict identical behaviour across treatments. However, 
according to alternative theories from social psychology, behaviour may be different.  
Moral balancing theories claim that a deviation from a “normal state of being” is balanced 
with a subsequent action compensating the prior behaviour (Brañas-Garza et al. 2013). Moral 
licensing, for example, claims that past good deeds favour a positive self-reporting which 
creates licensing effects and decrease the likelihood of additional good deeds in the future 
(Merritt et al. 2010). Symmetrically, past bad actions trigger negative feelings and make 
people more likely to engage in future moral behaviour to offset those (Sachdeva et al. 2009). 
Based on moral regulation theory, treatment differences in the first round should be balanced 
in the following donation decision. In particular, we can formulate the following hypotheses 
based on moral balancing theory: 
H3a: In the absence of additional incentives, contributions in the first round are higher 
(lower) than in the second round. 
H3b: If the economic mechanism leads to higher (lower) contributions in the first round, 
lower (higher) contributions are expected in the second round compared to baseline. 
Alternatively, preferences for consistency seeking behaviour (Festinger 1957, Taylor 1975, 
Cialdini et al. 1995) imply that higher (lower) contributions in round one should be followed 
by higher (lower) contributions in round two. The individual anchor point might shift due to 
the influence of the economic mechanism in the first round (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004) and 
thereby spill-over to the second round even though the scheme is removed. We formulate the 
following alternative hypotheses based on consistency theory: 
H4a: In the absence of additional incentives, contributions in the first and second round 
are at the same level. 
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H4b: If the economic mechanism leads to higher (lower) contributions in the first round, 
higher (lower) contributions are expected in the second round compared to baseline. 
There is an ongoing debate on the factors that determine which of the two theories prevails 
(e.g. Effron and Monin 2010, Merritt et al. 2010). Taking individual moral characteristics into 
account, the psychological theory of morality distinguishes deontologists and 
consequentialists (see, e.g. Singer 1991). Deontologists are goal-based persons, who are 
guided by moral norms and rules (Alexander and Moore 2008, Cornelissen et al. 2013). In 
contrast, consequentialists are morally oriented towards the outcome of their decisions, which 
means they justify their moral behaviour by the consequences (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, 
Cornelissen et al. 2013). Cornelissen et al. (2013) provide experimental evidence suggesting 
that moral balancing is less prominent for people with a deontological (goal-based) 
framework as opposed to people with a consequentialist (outcome based) moral framework. 
Hence, we expect moral balancing to be present for the group of consequentialists only. 
H5: Subjects with a deontological framework are more likely to behave according to 
consistency theory, while subjects with a consequentialist framework are more likely to 
behave according to moral balancing theory. 
5. Results 
Total contributions (TC), i.e. contributions including income tax, add up to €602.50, which 
are approximately 25% of the endowment. The detailed results of the static and the dynamic 
effects are discussed in the following sections.  
[about here: Table 2: Summary Statistics] 
5.1 Static Effects 
At first, we analyse the static effects – the immediate impact of the economic interventions on 
the contributions in the first round. Average voluntary contributions (VC) are €1.40 in the 
baseline treatment, €2.78 the in lottery treatment and €1.34 in the tax treatment, i.e. donations 
excluding the income tax.  
In pairwise comparisons of first round donations, we find that the monetary incentive in form 
of tickets for a charitable lottery increases voluntary contributions significantly. In the lottery 
treatment, more money is raised than in the other two treatments (p=0.002 compared to 
baseline and p=0.001 compared to tax, Mann-Whitney U test). Compared to baseline, both the 
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number of donors (p=0.078, Mann-Whitney U test) and the average donations of donors are 
higher (p=0.012).6 
Result 1: The presence of a charitable lottery increases both average donations of 
donors and the number of donors in the first round. 
In the first round of the tax treatment, we test whether the presence of an income tax crowds 
out voluntary contributions. Full crowding out would imply equal total contributions 
(including tax) as in baseline. This hypothesis is clearly rejected (p=0.000, Mann-Whitney U 
test). Moreover, it would imply that the share of non-donors in the tax treatment equals the 
share of subjects donating no more than the income tax (€2) in baseline. This hypothesis is 
also clearly rejected (p=0.000, Mann-Whitney U test), as there are only 39.6% non-donors in 
tax, while 80.4% of subjects donate up to €2 in baseline. In a next step, we test whether there 
is any crowding out at all. We cannot reject equal voluntary contributions (excluding tax) as 
in baseline (p=0.678, Mann-Whitney U test) and only marginally reject identical shares of 
donors (p=0.087, Mann-Whitney U test). Hence, while there is marginal crowding out of 
donors, this effect is not prevalent on the level of voluntary donations. This result is 
confirmed by a test of equal distribution that cannot be rejected (p=0.481, KS exact test). 
Restricting the sample to only donors, the difference of tax and baseline becomes significant 
(p=0.079). In summary, we clearly reject full crowding out and only find weak evidence for 
crowding out at all. 
Result 2: The presence of an income tax does only weakly affect voluntary donations in 
the first round. 
Regression analyses support the results of the first round. We apply a two-step estimation 
approach. Firstly, we estimate a Probit model including the whole sample to analyse the 
decision to voluntarily contribute or not.7 Secondly, we estimate an OLS model only 
including the voluntarily contributing subjects to analyse the amount of voluntary 
contributions. In both estimation steps we include the same explanatory variables, which are 
the treatments and socio-demographic data (gender, ln-age, religion, and nationality).8 The 
first step estimation supports the previous results that the lottery treatment attracts 
significantly more donors. Furthermore, the amount contributed by the donors is also 
6 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test) on equality of distributions shows that the voluntary contributions in 
baseline are significantly smaller than in the lottery treatment (exact p=0.005) with the largest difference of 0.34. 
7 The marginal effects are estimated with the average marginal effect. 
8 We decided only on these invariable regressors because other explanatory variables might be object to 
endogenous problems. Binary regressors are estimated with the finite-difference method.  
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significantly higher in the lottery treatment compared to baseline. For the tax treatment we 
find that an income tax leads to a smaller number of donors than in baseline, but it is only 
marginally significant (p=0.103). Furthermore, our estimations on the amount of voluntary 
contributions show that there is no significant difference from baseline.  
[about here: Table 3: Regression on voluntary contributions Round 1] 
5.2 Dynamic Effects 
To analyse the dynamic effects of how charitable giving evolves over time, we firstly examine 
differences between the first and the second round within the treatments. In Figure 1 we plot 
individuals’ donations in the second round against their voluntary contributions in the first 
round.  
[about here: Figure 1: Individual donations in Round 1 and Round 2] 
In baseline, donations in the second round tend to be lower than in the first round (see Figure 
1). On average, the voluntary contributions decrease from €1.40 in the first round of the 
experiment to €1.26 in the second round, but not significantly (Wilcoxon sign-rank test, 
p=0.396).  
Result 3: In absence of additional incentives, we do not observe moral balancing in the 
aggregate. 
Individuals in the lottery treatment donate less in the second round of the game than in the 
first round. On average, voluntary contributions decrease significantly (p=0.000) from €2.78 
to €1.78 in the second round. 
Donations in the second round of the tax treatment tend to exceed the voluntary contributions 
of the first round. On average the voluntary contributions increase significantly from €1.34 to 
€1.73 (p=0.005). We observe not only consistent selfish behaviour (zero voluntary 
contributions) in both rounds of the game like Brosig et al. (2007), but also consistent pro-
social behaviour (contributing exactly the same amount in both rounds). The result for the tax 
treatment is in line with Gneezy et al. (2012), who show stable behaviour even if the pro-
social behaviour at first is costly.  
In order to analyse the dynamic effects of the economic mechanisms, we compare the 
donations of the previously incentivised treatments (lottery and tax) to the baseline treatment 
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without any previous incentives. We find substantial differences in individual contributions 
over treatments.  
[about here : Table 4: Percentage of Consistent Voluntary Contributors by Treatment] 
Average donations in the second round are €1.26 in the baseline treatment, €1.78 in the lottery 
treatment and €1.73 in the tax treatment (see Figure 2).  
[about here: Figure 2: Average Donations in Round 1 and Round 2] 
In the second round, donations are highest in the lottery treatment. However, bilateral tests for 
median equality do not reveal significant differences, (lottery vs. baseline p=0.857, tax vs. 
baseline p=0.131, Mann-Whitney U tests). Also, the KS-test of equal distribution cannot be 
rejected neither for baseline and lottery (KS-exact-test p=0.520) nor for baseline and tax (KS-
exact-test p=0.307). The share of donors in the second round is not significantly different 
when comparing it to baseline (lottery vs. baseline p=0.105, tax vs. baseline p=0.585). When 
restricting the sample to donors, defined as subjects contributing positive amounts in the 
second round, differences get more significant (lottery vs. baseline p=0.005, tax vs. baseline 
p=0.098) suggesting a (weak) influence of first round treatment on second round behaviour. 
Result 4.1: The presence of a charitable lottery in the first round weakly increases 
contributions in the second round, whereas the number of donors is not influenced 
compared to baseline. 
Result 4.2: The presence of an income tax in the first round weakly increases 
contributions in the second round, whereas the number of donors is not influenced 
compared to baseline. 
Regarding the disposable endowment, which equals €6 in the first round of the tax treatment 
and €8 for all other treatments and rounds, subjects in the lottery and tax treatment continue to 
give a higher share in the second round compared to baseline.  
[about here: Figure 3: Average Voluntary Contributions (VC) as shares of disposable 
endowment in Round 1 and Round 2] 
As in the first round analysis, we also apply a two-step model to analyse contributions. The 
results support our previous analyses (see Table 4). In the lottery as well as in the tax 
treatment, the propensity to donate is not significantly different from baseline, with a slightly 
smaller number of donors in lottery. The amount of donations in the lottery treatment, 
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however, is higher than in baseline (p<0.01), which is in line with the previous bilateral tests 
restricted to donors. The results for the tax treatment support previous analyses, but are not 
significant.  
[about here: Table 5: Regression on voluntary contributions Round 2] 
Comparing the first round contributions between treatments enables us to analyse the 
immediate treatment effects of the economic interventions. We find that the charitable lottery 
significantly increases donations. The income tax only weakly crowds out voluntary 
contributions. By comparing donations in the second round across the treatments, we find 
weakly significant differences in average donations. Higher donations in the first round lead 
to higher donations in the second round compared to baseline. These results support 
consistency seeking behaviour.  
5.3 The influence of the moral framework 
So far, the average and individual results support the consistency theory, but the individuals’ 
moral framework might foster consistency seeking or moral balancing behaviour (Cornelissen 
et al. 2013). We extend our analysis of dynamics to the moral framework of individuals. In a 
post-questionnaire we asked subjects to rate a list of statements either related to the 
deontological or the consequential moral framework with respect to their agreement. For the 
deontological moral framework with a rule-based mind-set we use the following statements: 
“Everybody should give a part of his/her income”, “One has to help people in need”, 
“Everybody should be socially engaged”, and “We shall help strangers in the same way we 
help our relatives”. On the other hand, we also stated phrases that support a consequentialist 
view: “One can also deny help if one has helped before“, and “You should help where most 
needed”. Based on this categorisation we created a dummy variable (deontologist) in the spirit 
of Mayo and Marks (1990)9 by including the sum of all five items related to deontology.10 
The distinction into deontologist and consequentialist and their donations is provided in Table 
6 for each treatment. 
[about here: Table 6: Summary Statistics Moral Framework] 
9 Alternatively, we create a dummy equal to one if a subject fully agreed to at least one of the deontologist 
statements and did not fully agree to at least one of the consequentialist statements. The results were 
qualitatively similar. 
10 Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.560. As we do not use questionnaire items this value is still acceptable. 
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The decrease between rounds in the baseline treatment is significant when controlling for the 
moral framework. Subjects classified as deontologist give €0.13 more on average (p=0.365), 
while consequentialists reduce donations by €0.31 in the second round (p=0.066). The 
difference is significant (p=0.058). These results confirm previous evidence suggesting that 
subjects with a deontological moral framework are less likely to behave in line with the theory 
of moral balancing (e.g. Cornelissen et al. 2013). Interestingly, deontologists do not donate 
more on average in the first round of baseline (p=0.738). Only in the second round, the 
difference becomes apparent (p=0.138).  
Result 6.1: In the absence of economic stimuli, subjects with a consequentialist 
framework show behaviour of moral balancing while those with a deontologist 
framework do not. 
Extending our analysis of the moral framework to the lottery treatment shows that subjects 
classified as deontologists give €0.77 less in round two (p=0.014), while consequentialists 
reduce donations by €0.13 in the second round (p=0.000). The difference is significant 
(p=0.073). Deontologists give €3.38 in round one, whereas consequentialists only give €2.09. 
This is confirmed when comparing both groups across treatments.11 Deontologists give 
significantly more in lottery than in baseline (p=0.005), while the difference is not significant 
for consequentialists (p=0.179). In round two, the gap between groups widens as 
deontologists give €2.62 and consequentialists give €0.83 (p=0.001). If the lottery destroys 
the moral image, consequentialists should give more in round two than in baseline, and if not, 
they should give less. Deontologists should be more stable across rounds to avoid cognitive 
dissonance. In round two, subjects classified as deontologists give similar, even slightly 
higher amounts than in baseline (p=0.191), while subjects classified as consequentialists only 
give less than in baseline (p=0.130). Despite being slightly off the conventional levels of 
significance, this signals the tendency to balance donations for consequentialists. Looking at 
the sum over both rounds, the effect of a lottery almost disappears for consequentialists 
(p=0.442), while total contributions of deontologists are positively affected by the lottery 
(p=0.015).  
11 As we cannot observe the same subject under both conditions, we compare consequentialists and deontologists 
across treatments. The moral framework is not affected by treatment assignment (p>0.2), hence the exogeneity 
assumption holds. 
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Result 6.2: In the presence of a lottery, subjects with a consequentialist framework show 
behaviour of moral balancing, while those with a deontologist framework show 
consistency seeking behaviour. 
Controlling for individual attitudes in the tax treatment yields the following picture: Subjects 
classified as deontologists give €0.48 more in round two (p=0.038), while consequentialists 
increase donations by €0.29 in the second round (p=0.058). The difference, however, is not 
significant (p=0.507). In round one of the tax treatment, deontologists donate €1.94, while 
consequentialists donate €0.75. The difference is significant (p=0.001, n=48). Thus, 
individual differences across rounds do not seem to depend on motivational aspects. 
However, this still could mean that they matter in comparison to baseline. We can also test for 
a crowding out related to the moral framework. Deontologists almost crowd in own 
contributions in the presence of a tax compared to baseline (p=0.271), while consequentialists 
crowd out contributions (p=0.088). In round two of tax, the differences in levels persist. 
Deontologists donate €2.42, which is significantly more than the consequentialists’ average 
donations of €1.04 (p=0.009). Deontologists give more after the tax (p=0.140), while 
consequentialists even fall short of baseline contributions (p=0.562). In terms of total 
contributions, this leads to increases for deontologists (p=0.176) and decreases for 
consequentialists (p=0.570) compared to baseline. 
Result 6.3: In the presence of a tax, subjects with a consequentialist framework crowd 
out contributions but do not show behaviour of moral balancing, while those with a 
deontologist framework do not crowd out contributions and show consistency seeking 
behaviour. 
Summarizing the results, subjects with a deontological moral framework increase their 
donations more strongly in the presence of a lottery and are at the same time less likely to 
lower their donations afterwards. On the other hand, consequentialists exhibit marginal levels 
of balancing also in the context of a lottery. Hence, there might be some backfiring after a 
lottery, but not for those who are confident that giving is a key goal. Deontologists crowd in 
contributions, while consequentialists crowd out contributions. Moreover, while 
consequentialists have been shown to be prone to moral balancing in baseline, they do not 
react with increased contributions after the tax.  
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6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper we study two different drivers of charitable giving with a special focus on their 
dynamic effects. Immediate effects of economic interventions show higher contributions in 
the lottery treatment and no crowding out in the tax treatment. After the two interventions, 
charitable lottery and income tax, donations are higher than in a control setting without these 
mechanisms. Psychological literature stresses that stability of behaviour depends on the 
context and individual attributes (e.g. age see Brown et al. 2005). More evidence for 
consistency is found when subjects can recall their previous behaviour quite well (Merritt et 
al. 2010, Jordan et al. 2011). If two tasks are rather different, inconsistent behaviour may 
occur (Thøgersen 2004). Given the two round structure and the repeated donation decisions, 
our findings of consistency seeking on the aggregates seem to be plausible. Furthermore, 
subjects distinguish between key and negligible elements of their personal concept in valuing 
cognitive dissonance (e.g. Dickerson et al. 1992). In particular, the moral framework of the 
subject may be decisive. Especially subjects with a rule-based mind-set reveal consistent 
behaviour.  
In particular, we add further evidence for the effectiveness of charitable lotteries, which are 
common in the absence of tax power (Morgan 2000). The long term effects of Landry et al. 
(2010), who found lotteries to raise higher donations also in subsequent donation decisions, 
can be supported. Subjects with a deontological moral mind-set are not only more motivated 
by a lottery, but the donors also keep contributing at a similar level afterwards. Of course, the 
type of the prize might drive the donation decision, depending on the nature of its value 
(private or common, see e.g. Onderstal et al. 2013), but attracting people with a charitable 
lottery might also pay-off for subsequent calls for donation without any lottery. Given the 
results from Landry et al. (2006, 2010), our results might suggest that door-to-door campaigns 
with charitable lotteries attract a pool of people with a deontological mind-set.  
Moreover, our experiment provides support on the implications by Crumpler and Grossman 
(2008) that taxation can increase the total revenues of charities. Our finding of no crowding 
out strongly differs from Eckel et al. (2005), who cannot reject full crowding out in a similar 
setting. In Eckel et al. (2005), subjects got their money after the donation decision and 
donations were transferred via checks dropped in a mailbox by an observer. In our design, 
subjects receive the endowment of €8 in cash in each round and financial transfers are made 
through a local notary’s office. We chose this form as it is a more natural way to proceed in 
Germany. Testing the credibility of our experimental procedure with the same control 
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question as in Eckel et al. (2005) shows similar levels of trust. Hence, we do not think that 
this feature drives our results. Contrary to Eckel et al. (2005) examining immediate effects of 
an income tax on donation behaviour in a one round experiment, our subjects play a two 
round design. The second round is announced in advance and its content is disclosed in the 
second round. Although this is a larger disparity from the original setup, we do not see how 
the announcement of the second round could reduce the level of crowding out in the first 
round. As a consequence, we suspect differences in the subject pool to drive our results even 
though the participants in both experiments were students. Besides the obvious explanation of 
different levels of warm glow (Andreoni 1989 and 1990), of course also other cross-cultural 
differences between the U.S. and Germany come into play. As the moral framework seems to 
play an important role in the context of a tax, differences in the levels of deontologists may 
serve as an alternative explanation for our results that contradict previous findings from the 
U.S. 
Of course there are limitations when trying to formulate policy advice based on our results. 
The income tax was raised just once and transferred directly to the chosen charity. Income 
taxes in reality are raised repeatedly and are transferred to the government, not to a chosen 
charity. Further research would be needed to analyse the effect of different tax levels and 
longer periods of enforced taxes. Concerning the charitable lottery, we used a fixed prize with 
a common value of €100, so future research with different types of prizes and different levels 
of a common value prizes would lead to further insights. Moreover, as the predicted 
behaviour is orthogonal between consequentialists and deontologists, it seems to be important 
to extend this line of research in the economic literature. 
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8. Appendix 
Tables 
Table 1: Summary of Experimental Design 
Treatment Endowment 1st round 
Endowment 
2nd round Intervention 1
st round 
Baseline 8 8 No 
Lottery  8 8 Lottery ticket for each €0.50 donated Lottery prize €100 
Tax 8 8 €2 income tax 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Treatment No. of subjects 
Share of 
donors 1st 
round 
Average 
donation 1st 
round 
Share of 
donors 2nd 
round 
Average 
donation 2nd 
round 
Sum of 
donations 
Test for 
equal 
donations in 
both rounds 
Baseline 51 76% €1.40 75% €1.26 €2.66 p=0.396 
Lottery  49 90% €2.78 59% €1.78 €4.56 p=0.000 
Tax 48 60% (100%)* 
€1.34 
(€3.34)* 79% €1.73 
€3.07 
(€5.07)* 
p=0.005 
(p=0.000)* 
Note: *including income tax.  
 
Table 3: Regression on voluntary contributions Round 1  
Dependent variable Donation decision (yes/no) Donation level (ln_donation) 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 1) (Model 2) 
Lottery treatment 0.1509* 0.1784** 0.4954*** 0.4123** 
 (0.0781) (0.0749) (0.1651) (0.1610) 
Tax Treatment -0.1425 -0.1088 0.2898 0.1498 
 (0.0873) (0.0841) (0.1840) (0.1798) 
Male  -0.1502**  -0.2398* 
  (0.0680)  (0.1379) 
ln_Age  -0.0309  0.6740* 
  (0.1470)  (0.3420) 
German  0.0867  0.7319*** 
  (0.1105)  (0.2094) 
Religious  0.1373**  -0.3329** 
  (0.0670)  (0.1372) 
Constant   0.3317*** 
(0.1202) 
-2.0215* 
(1.0700) 
N 148 148 112 112 
Donation decision is estimated using a Probit specification, entries are average marginal effects. Donation level 
is estimated only for donors using OLS with the log of donations in round 1 as the dependent variable. Standard 
errors in brackets. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 4: Percentage of Consistent Voluntary Contributors by Treatment 
 Consistent VC Round 1 – Round 2 Inconsistent VC Round 1 – Round 2 
 VC = 0 VC>0 Increasing Decreasing 
Baseline 20% 39% 24% 18% 
Lottery 10% 33% 53% 4% 
Tax 17% 23% 15% 46% 
Note: Percentages may not total to 100 due to rounding. 
 
Table 5: Regression on voluntary contributions Round 2 
Dependent variable Donation decision (yes/no) Donation level (ln_donation) 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 1) (Model 2) 
Lottery treatment -0.1495 -0.1544 0.5594*** 0.5257*** 
 (0.0944) (0.0950) (0.1816) (0.1878) 
Tax Treatment 0.0504 0.0529 0.2654 0.2413 
 (0.0908) (0.0897) (0.1690) (0.1731) 
Male  -0.1452*  -0.0273 
  (0.0745)  (0.1476) 
ln_Age  0.2208  0.3924 
  (0.1826)  (0.3510) 
German  0.1246  0.5496** 
  (0.1175)  (0.2226) 
Religious  0.0354  0.0311 
  (0.0737)  (0.1443) 
Constant   0.2523** 
(0.1195) 
-1.4272 
(1.0905) 
N 148 148 105 105 
Donation decision is estimated using a Probit specification, entries are average marginal effects. Donation level 
is estimated only for donors using OLS with the log of donations in round 2 as the dependent variable. Standard 
errors in brackets. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 6: Summary Statistics Moral Framework 
Treatment Moral framework 
No. of 
subjects 
Average 
donation 
1st round 
Average 
donation 
2nd round 
Sum of 
donations 
Test for equal 
donations in 
both rounds 
Baseline 
Deontologist 20 €1.40 €1.53 €2.93 p=0.365 
Consequentialist 31 €1.40 €1.10 €2.50 p=0.066 
Lottery  
Deontologist 26 €3.38 €2.62 €6.00 p=0.014 
Consequentialist 23 €2.09 €0.83 €2.92 p=0.000 
Tax 
Deontologist 24 €1.94 €2.42 €4.36 p=0.038 
Consequentialist 24 €0.75 €1.04 €1.79 p=0.058 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Individual donations in Round 1 and Round 2 
 
 
  
Note: To avoid overplotting in scatterplots the individual donations were jittered up or down by a random number. 
Individual voluntary contributions serve as observations. Observations on the 45° reference line mark identical 
contributions in both rounds of the game. 
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Figure 2: Average Donations in Round 1 and Round 2 
 
Note: Reported are the average donations per treatment and round as well as the corresponding 90% confidence 
intervals for between subject comparisons. Donations in the 1st round of the tax treatment include the income tax 
of €2 which is marked in the shaded area. 
 
Figure 3: Average Voluntary Contributions (VC) as shares of disposable endowment in 
Round 1 and Round 2 
 
Note: Shares of endowment are calculated on base of disposable endowment, which means €6 in the 1st round of 
the tax treatment and €8 for all other treatments and rounds.  
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Additional Material 
A1: Instructions (translated from German)  
A1a: Baseline treatment  
Welcome! 
Thank you for participating. Please keep your mobile phones turned off during the whole event. Please do not 
talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. A staff member will answer your 
question. 
Apart from the instructions, also other material will be handed out in the course of the event.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This will be the first out of two rounds. In each round, you can earn money.  
We will now hand out an envelope and a receipt form. Inside the envelope, you will find 8: two 2 euro coins, 
three 1 euro coins and two 50 cent coins. Please open the envelope and make sure that the amount is correct. 
Then, please confirm that you received the 8 euros on the enclosed receipt form. Afterwards, the form will be 
collected by a staff member. With this receipt you confirm that you received the amount of the first round. 
Please remain seated after the collection until you receive further instructions. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We will now present you six different charities. You have the possibility to financially support one of these 
goals. Therefore, you will receive a sheet with a personal code and a decision sheet. Please keep your personal 
code to yourself during the whole event. It will ensure the anonymity of your decision. Neither other participants 
nor staff members can link the code to your name. Please note that we cannot issue any contribution receipts due 
to the anonymity of your decision.  
1. Please enter your personal code in the space provided on the decision sheet and on the envelope. 
2. After that, please read the descriptions of the charity carefully. Please mark the charity that is most worthy 
of receiving the donation in your opinion on the decision sheet with an “X”. By choosing a charity, you do 
not automatically commit to a real donation. Please note that you can only choose one charity.  
3. In the next step, please decide how you would like to divide the 8 euros between yourself and the chosen 
charity. The donation can range between 0 and 8 euros in steps of 0.50 euros. Please note that you can only 
financially support one charity. Indicate the amount you would like to donate to the charity as well as the 
amount you want to keep for yourself on the bottom of the decision sheet.   
4. Put the donation and the decision sheet into the envelope. Make sure that you have written your code on the 
decision sheet and on the envelope. Please check that the coins in the envelope match the amount of your 
donation on the sheet. Please seal the envelope afterwards. A staff member will collect the envelopes. Please 
keep the money you do not wish to donate to yourself. 
 
Information: The opening of your envelopes and the money transfer take place under the supervision of a 
notary. After the event, the total amount of donations will be published on our homepage. We will inform you 
about this via email. All the information on the charities is true.  
Example 1: If you do not wish to donate anything, please enter 0 euros for the charity and 8 euros for yourself. 
In this case, only put the completed decision sheet into the envelope. 
Example 2: If you wish to donate the maximum amount, please enter 8 euros for the charity and 0 euros for 
yourself. In this case, put the completed decision sheet and the 8 euros into the envelope. 
Please remain seated after the collection until you receive further instructions. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
This will be the second and therefore last round.  
We will again hand out an envelope and a receipt form. Inside the envelope, you will find 8 euros: two 2 euro 
coins, three 1 euro coins and two 50 cent coins. Please open the envelope and make sure that the amount is 
correct. Then, please confirm that you received the 8 euros on the enclosed receipt form. Afterwards, the form 
will be collected by a staff member. With this receipt you confirm that you received the amount of the second 
round. 
Please remain seated after the collection until you receive further instructions. 
 
We will present you another six different charities. You have the possibility to financially support one of these 
goals. Therefore, you will again receive a decision sheet.  
1. Please enter your personal code in the space provided on the decision sheet and on the envelope. 
2. After that, please read the descriptions of the charity carefully. Please mark the charity that is most worthy 
of receiving the donation in your opinion on the decision sheet with an “X”. By choosing a charity, you do 
not automatically commit to a real donation. Please note that you can only choose one charity.  
25 
 
3. In the next step, please decide how you would like to divide the 8 euros between yourself and the chosen 
charity. The donation can range between 0 and 8 euros in steps of 0.50 euros. Please note that you can only 
financially support one charity. Indicate the amount you would like to donate to the charity as well as the 
amount you want to keep for yourself on the bottom of the decision sheet.   
4. Put the donation and the decision sheet into the envelope. Make sure that you have written your code on the 
decision sheet and on the envelope. Please check that the coins in the envelope match the amount of your 
donation on the sheet. Please seal the envelope afterwards. A staff member will collect the envelopes. Please 
keep the money you do not wish to donate to yourself. 
 
Information: The opening of your envelopes and the money transfer take place under the supervision of a 
notary. After the event, the total amount of donations will be published on our homepage. We will inform you 
about this via email. All the information on the charities is true.  
Example 1: If you do not wish to donate anything, please enter 0 euros for the charity and 8 euros for yourself. 
In this case, only put the completed decision sheet into the envelope. 
Example 2: If you wish to donate the maximum amount, please enter 8 euros for the charity and 0 euros for 
yourself. In this case, put the completed decision sheet and the 8 euros into the envelope. 
Please remain seated after the collection until you receive further instructions. 
 
A1b: Lottery treatment (first round) 
Welcome! 
Thank you for participating. Please keep your mobile phones turned off during the whole event. Please do not 
talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. A staff member will answer your 
question. 
Apart from the instructions, also other material will be handed out in the course of the event.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This will be the first out of two rounds. In each round, you can earn money.  
We will now hand out an envelope and a receipt form. Inside the envelope, you will find 8 euros: two 2 euro 
coins, three 1 euro coins and two 50 cent coins. Please open the envelope and make sure that the amount is 
correct. Then, please confirm that you received the 8 euros on the enclosed receipt form. Afterwards, the form 
will be collected by a staff member. With this receipt you confirm that you received the amount of the first 
round. 
Please remain seated after the collection until you receive further instructions. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We will now present you six different charities. You have the possibility to financially support one of these 
goals. Therefore, you will receive a sheet with a personal code and a decision sheet. Please keep your personal 
code to yourself during the whole event. It will ensure the anonymity of your decision. Neither other participants 
nor staff members can link the code to your name. Please note that we cannot issue any contribution receipts due 
to the anonymity of your decision.  
1. Please enter your personal code in the space provided on the decision sheet and on the envelope. 
2. After that, please read the descriptions of the charity carefully. Please mark the charity that is most worthy 
of receiving the donation in your opinion on the decision sheet with an “X”. By choosing a charity, you do 
not automatically commit to a real donation. Please note that you can only choose one charity.  
3. In the next step, please decide how you would like to divide the 8 euros between yourself and the charity of 
your choice. The donation can range between 0 and 8 euros in steps of 0.50 euros. Please note that you can 
only financially support one charity. Indicate the amount you would like to donate to the charity as well as 
the amount you want to keep for yourself at the bottom of the decision sheet. For each donation of 0.50 euro 
you receive a lottery ticket for the participation in a price draw in which you can win 100 euros in cash. 
Your personal code serves as the lottery ticket number to ensure the anonymity of your decision. For 
example, if you donate 2 euros, you will receive four lottery tickets. If you donate 2.50 euros, you will 
receive five lottery tickets, etc. After all the events of this week, the number of lottery tickets corresponding 
to your donation is marked with your code and enters the prize draw together with the lottery tickets of the 
other participants. Altogether, up to 60 participants get the possibility to take part in the prize draw. 
Afterwards, one lottery ticket is drawn by chance to select the winning of the 100 euros. The filling of the 
raffle box as well as the draw will be supervised by a notary. All participants of the event will be informed 
via e-mail about the code drawn. Neither the staff nor the other participants are able to assign the code to 
your name. To claim your prize, you have to identify yourself with the sheet that has your code on it, which 
was handed out at the beginning of the event, and you have to confirm the receipt of the 100 euros with your 
signature. Therefore, please keep the code in a safe place. 
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4. Put the donation and the decision sheet into the envelope. Make sure that you have written your code on the 
decision sheet and on the envelope. Please check that the coins in the envelope match the amount of your 
donation on the sheet. Please seal the envelope afterwards. A staff member will collect the envelopes. Please 
keep the money you do not wish to donate to yourself. 
 
Information: The opening of your envelopes and the money transfer take place under the supervision of a 
notary. After the event, the total amount of donations will be published on our homepage. We will inform you 
about this via email. All the information on the charities is true.  
Example 1: If you do not wish to donate anything, please enter 0 euros for the charity and 8 euros for yourself. 
In this case, only put the completed decision sheet into the envelope. In this case no lottery ticket with your 
personal code is put into the raffle box. 
Example 2: If you wish to donate the maximum amount, please enter 8 euros for the charity and 0 euros for 
yourself. In this case, put the completed decision sheet and the 8 euros into the envelope. In this case 16 lottery 
tickets with your personal code are put into the raffle box. 
Please remain seated after the collection until you receive further instructions. 
 
A1c: Tax treatment (first round) 
Welcome! 
Thank you for participating. Please keep your mobile phones turned off during the whole event. Please do not 
talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. A staff member will answer your 
question. 
Apart from the instructions, also other material will be handed out in the course of the event.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This will be the first out of two rounds. In each round, you can earn money.  
We will now hand out an envelope and a receipt form. Inside the envelope, you will find 8 euros: two 2 euro 
coins, three 1 euro coins and two 50 cent coins. Please open the envelope and make sure that the amount is 
correct. Then, please confirm that you received the 8 euros on the enclosed receipt form. Afterwards, the form 
will be collected by a staff member. With this receipt you form that you received the amount of the first round. 
Please remain seated after the collection until you receive further instructions. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We will now present you six different charities. You have the possibility to financially support one of these 
goals. Therefore, you will receive a sheet with a personal code and a decision sheet. Please keep your personal 
code to yourself during the whole event. It will ensure the anonymity of your decision. Neither other participants 
nor staff members can link the code to your name. Please note that we cannot issue any contribution receipts due 
to the anonymity of your decision.  
1. Please enter your personal code in the space provided on the decision sheet and on the envelope. 
2. After that, please read the descriptions of the charity carefully. Please mark the charity that is most worthy 
of receiving the donation in your opinion on the decision sheet with an “X”. By choosing a charity, you do 
not automatically commit to a real donation. Please note that you can only choose one charity.  
3. The amount paid out to you is subject to income tax at a rate of 25%. This corresponds to an amount of 2 
euros. The income tax of 2 euros is transferred to your chosen charity organisation automatically Your 
income after taxes is now 6 euros. In the next step, please decide how you would like to divide the 6 euros 
between yourself and the chosen charity. The donation can range between 0 and 6 euros in steps of 0.50 
euros. Please note that you can only financially support one charity. Indicate the amount you would like to 
donate to the charity as well as the amount you want to keep for yourself at the bottom of the decision sheet.   
4. Put the donation and the income tax of 2 euros as well as the decision sheet into the envelope. Make sure 
that you have written your code on the decision sheet and on the envelope. Please check that the coins in the 
envelope match the amount of your donation on the sheet. Please seal the envelope afterwards. A staff 
member will collect the envelopes. Please keep the money you do not wish to donate to yourself. 
 
Information: The opening of your envelopes and the money transfer take place under the supervision of a 
notary. After the event, the total amount of donations will be published on our homepage. We will inform you 
about this via email. All the information on the charities is true.  
Example 1: If you do not wish to donate anything, please enter 0 euros for the charity and 6 euros for yourself. 
In this case, put the completed decision sheet and the income tax of 2 euros into the envelope. 
Example 2: If you wish to donate the maximum amount, please enter 6 euros for the charity and 0 euros for 
yourself. In this case, put the completed decision sheet and the 8 euros (2 euros income tax + 6 euros donation) 
into the envelope. 
Please remain seated after the collection until you receive further instructions. 
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A2: Decision sheets baseline treatment (translated form German) 
A2a) Version 1  
 
 
Code: __________________________________________ (please enter your code here) 
 
Charity 
Please mark the charity that is most worthy of receiving the donation in your opinion on the decision sheet with 
an “X”. (Note: You can only select one charity.) 
 
O 
Stromspar-Check  
Stromspar-Check helps low-income households in Mannheim to save electricity. The electricity saved 
contributes to the financial relief of households and reduces CO2 emissions. 
O 
Deutscher Caritasverband 
Caritas is a German Catholic welfare organisation. Caritas supports people in need in Germany and the 
rest of the world. 
 
O 
SOS – Kinderdorf 
SOS-Kinderdorf promotes the needs, concerns and rights of children worldwide. The main focus lies on 
abandoned and neglected girls and boys as well as disadvantaged families. 
O 
UNO-Flüchtlingshilfe 
The UNO-Flüchtlingshilfe promotes aid projects for refugees both nationally and internationally. Their 
work comprises emergency relief actions in the event of an acute crisis, assistance in the return to the 
country of origin as well as the promotion of vocational training and continuing education.  
O 
World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) 
The WWF concentrates on the preservation of the biological diversity on earth, the sustainable use of 
natural resources as well as the containment of environmental pollution and damaging consumer 
behaviour.   
O 
Ärzte ohne Grenzen 
Ärzte ohne Grenzen manages medical support in crisis areas and war zones. Their work comprises 
medical emergency assistance, the provision of clean water and latrines as well as medical education of 
the public. 
 
Please indicate now how you would like to divide the 8 euros between yourself and the selected charity: 
 
1. I donate _____________ euros to my selected charity. 
(The amount can range between 0 and 8 euros in steps of 0.50 euros.) 
 
2. I keep _____________ euros. 
(The amount you keep can range between 0 and 8 euros in steps of 0.50 euros. The amounts under 1. and 2. have 
to add up to 8 euros altogether.)  
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A2b) Version 2  
 
 
Code: __________________________________________ (please enter your code here) 
 
Charity 
Please mark the charity that is most worthy of receiving the donation in your opinion on the decision sheet with 
an “X”. (Note: You can only select one charity.) 
 
O 
Caritas-Tafel 
Caritas-Tafel in Mannheim contributes to the financial relief of low-income households. Households in 
need can buy discounted groceries there. 
 
O 
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz 
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz saves lives, assists in acute emergencies, supports poor people and those in 
need, and monitors international law. 
 
O 
Kinderhilfswerk der Vereinten Nationen (UNICEF) 
The Kinderhilfswerk der Vereinten Nationen works especially in developing countries and supports 
children and mothers in the areas of health, family planning, hygiene, nutrition as well as education and 
provides humanitarian aid in emergencies.  
O 
Amnesty International 
Amnesty International promotes human rights worldwide. They research continuously the human rights 
situation all over the world and take action against specific human rights violations. 
O 
Greenpeace 
Greenpeace is an environmental organisation. Greenpeace concentrates on international issues such as 
global warming, deforestation, overfishing, commercial whaling and campaigns against nuclear power  
O 
Brot für die Welt 
Brot für die Welt is a relief organisation that operates worldwide. Their focus lies on the security of 
food supply, education and health, peace and human rights as well as Aids. 
 
 
 
Please indicate now how you would like to divide the 8 euros between yourself and the selected charity: 
 
1. I donate _____________ euros to my selected charity. 
(The amount can range between 0 and 8 euros in steps of 0.50 euros.) 
 
2. I keep _____________ euros. 
(The amount you keep can range between 0 and 8 euros in steps of 0.50 euros. The amounts under 1. and 2. have 
to add up to 8 euros altogether.)  
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